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The Phosphate Archipelago: 
Imperial Mining and Global Agriculture  
in French North Africa 
Abstract: This article analyzes the network of phosphate producing sites in 
French colonial North Africa in the twentieth century. By tracing phosphate 
flows across the region between mining sites, and by placing the North African 
network into imperial and global perspective, the article develops the concept 
of a phosphate archipelago, capable of recognizing the shared specificities of 
the phosphate mines as extractive spaces and of describing their insertion into 
adjacent local and regional dynamics. Drawing on political-economic writings 
after World War One, the article focuses mainly on phosphates’ role in the 
colonial politics of economic autarky, but also touches on labour migration, the 
role of phosphates as an actor, and the trajectory of the phosphate archipelago 
in North Africa across the watershed of independence in the 1950s and down to 
the present day, when it plays a key role in the politics of global nutrition and 
food security. 
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1  “Khouribga is Phosphatville” 
Khouribga1* is in the El Borouj region of Morocco, on the Oulad Abdoun plateau 
some 120 km south-east of Casablanca. High grade rock phosphate first emerged 
there in 1921, when 8,232 tons were mined. By 1924 that figure had risen to 
|| 
1-Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France, (ANOM), BIB AOM 20464, France-
Eurafrique 142, May-June 1963, p. 22. 
Simon Jackson (Ph.D.), History Office 330, Arts Building, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, 
Birmingham, B15 2TT, E-Mail: s.jackson.1@bham.ac.uk 
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430,000 tons.2 From then on production rose rapidly, and after World War Two 
and independence from France in 1956, Morocco became the world’s leading 
exporter of rock phosphate, as well as the country that controlled the largest 
global reserves, including those at Bu-Craa in Western Sahara, and, as Lino 
Camprubí has recently shown, a dominant player in world phosphate geopolitics.3 
The extraction of rock phosphate from the ground and its transformation into 
crop fertilizer is a critical, if relatively unknown, component of contemporary 
global agriculture and food production. Along with nitrogen and potassium 
nutrients, its use in the twentieth century expanded rapidly, as Moroccan 
production attests. Phosphate-based fertilizer became a pivotal agent of 
agrochemical systems during the “Green Revolution” and continues in that role 
today. Phosphate, in a nutshell, has helped foster radically increased crop 
yields and the feeding of a large and growing human population – not for 
nothing does the Moroccan state phosphate company (OCP), prominently 
feature adjacent, ticking world population and arable land counters on its 
website.4 But compared to paradigmatic extraction systems such as the oil 
industry, phosphate, for all its potential as a symbol of environmental catastrophe 
– impossible to manufacture artificially, vital to world food production, 
scheduled to be decisively depleted in the coming half century according to 
some estimates – has traditionally received relatively little scholarly attention 
and less public attention. That has changed somewhat in the last decade, in 
part thanks to high prices for rock phosphate in the commodities markets and a 
growing awareness of its importance to world food security.  
Social scientific analysis since 2008 has focused in the main on the debate, 
initiated by Dana Cordell among others, about “peak phosphorous” and the 
potential ramifications for farming and planetary human demography of a 
decline in phosphate production.5 Couched in an inter-disciplinary mode 
towards policy solutions, this view warns of the exhaustion of phosphorous 
resources. It has portrayed global fertilizer-driven agriculture, despite its 
|| 
2-R. Goepfert, Les Phosphates Algériens et l’Agriculture Française. L’Exploitation du Gisement 
du Djebel Onk (PhD. Diss.), Paris 1925, p. 40. 
3-L. Camprubí, Resource Geopolitics. Cold War Technologies, Global Fertilizers, and the Fate of 
Western Sahara, in: Technology and Culture 56, 2015, p. 677. 
4-http://www.ocpgroup.ma/ (1/11/2015). 
5-K. Ashley/D. Cordell/D. Mavinic, A Brief History of Phosphorus: From the Philosopher’s Stone to 
Nutrient Recovery and Reuse, in: Chemosphere 84, no. 6, 2011, pp. 737-46. 
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enormous technological and social momentum, as a system whose days are 
numbered – unless a fix is found through re-cycling and technical advances.6  
For their part, historians of agrochemical commodity circuits and the life-
worlds that form and dissolve around them have tended to embrace increasingly 
oceanic and global spatial frameworks. They have done this partly to identify and 
better trace the sprawling violence of the social relations underpinning produc-
production. For instance, Edward D. Melillo, in his work on the trans-Pacific 
making of the global nitrogen fertilizer trade, has described the horrific working 
conditions that prompted many Chinese workers to kill themselves on the 
Chincha guano islands off Peru in the late nineteenth century.7 And, in a mode 
reminiscent of the wider preoccupation with the anthropocentric rupture in 
environmental historiography, historians have also embraced larger scales so as 
to underline the irreversible changes wrought by industrial agriculture and a 
globalized plant nutrition circuit.8 Vandana Shiva, Frank Uekötter and others 
have therefore emphasized the way that the fertilizer-seed packages of the mid-
twentieth century “Green Revolution” and its precursors pushed many farmers 
across the world into dependency and despair.9  
|| 
6-P. Déry/B. Anderson, Peak Phosphorus, in: Energy Bulletin, 2007; criticisms include R.H.E.M. 
Koppelaar/H.P. Weikard, Assessing Phosphate Rock Depletion and Phosphorus Recycling 
Options, in: Global Environmental Change 23, 2013, pp. 1454-1466; R.W. Scholz/F.-W. Wellmer, 
Approaching a Dynamic View on the Availability of Mineral Resources. What We May Learn 
from the Case of Phosphorus?, in: Global Environmental Change 23, 2013, pp. 11-27; D. 
Cordell/J.-O. Drangert/S. White, The Story of Phosphorus. Global Food Security and Food for 
Thought, in: Global Environmental Change 19, 2009, pp. 292-305. I am indebted to Frank 
Uekötter for pointing me to these sources. See also M. Dixon, Phosphate, Fertilizers, and 
French North Africa: 1830s Through the Interwar Period, Unpublished paper presented at the 
conference “Global Commodity Flows”, Institute for Historical Studies, University of Texas, 
April 17th, 2015.  
7-E.D. Melillo, The First Green Revolution. Debt Peonage and the Making of the Nitrogen 
Fertilizer Trade, 1840-1930, in: American Historical Review 117, 2012, pp. 1028-1060. See 
generally R. Miller/R. Greenhill, The Fertilizer Commodity Chains. Guano and Nitrate, 1840-1930, 
in: S. Topik/C. Marichal/Z. Frank (Eds.), From Silver to Cocaine. Latin American Commodity 
Chains and the Building of the World Economy, 1500-2000, Durham 2006, pp. 228-270. 
8-On the anthropocene see representatively C. Otter et al., Forum. Technology, Ecology, and 
Human Health Since 1850, in: Environmental History 20, 2015, pp. 710-804; W.J. Belasco/R. 
Horowitz, Food Chains. From Farmyard to Shopping Cart, Philadelphia 2009. 
9-V. Shiva, The Violence of the Green Revolution. Third World Agriculture, Ecology and 
Politics, Penang 1991; F. Uekötter, Die Wahrheit ist auf dem Feld. Eine Wissensgeschichte der 
deutschen Landwirtschaft, Göttingen 2010. For a critique of analysis of farmer suicide in India 
see D. Münster, Farmers’ Suicides and the State in India. Conceptual and ethnographic notes 
from Wayanad, Kerala, in: Contributions to Indian Sociology 46, 2012, pp. 181-208. 
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Such approaches have much to offer. But often lost in them are the lives of 
specific extractive sites, and especially their regional situation in connective 
networks of similar extractive activity, networks I describe in this article as 
“archipelagos”. The occlusion of these specific histories – and their underpinning 
“archipelagic” regional geographies – is an empirical problem, neglecting actors 
and everyday power dynamics critical to extractive processes, or else privileging 
particular iconic sites in isolation. Spatially it also marginalizes intermediate 
economic spaces in favour of a presupposed global unit. Analytically, finally, 
neglect of specific sites and their archipelagic relationships reinforces nature-
culture dualisms in which the non-human is cantonized simply as a more-or-less 
plentiful resource that is discovered, extracted, transported, refined, marketed, 
applied and perhaps recycled.10 In fact phosphate itself, far from existing merely 
as a “natural resource”, strongly influenced the mix of local specificity and 
archipelagic similarity that developed between the varied phosphate “islands” I 
describe. 
In this article, I place phosphates themselves at the centre of the analysis, 
and trace the phosphate archipelago across the borders of colonial territories 
and later national states, though with a primary focus on the colonial 1920s. The 
metaphor of the archipelago helps this tracing process in several ways, for 
instance showing how phosphate flowed from the various mining nodes 
towards a network of ports and out to an imperial and global distribution and 
consumption chain, as input-intensive industrial agriculture increasingly 
dominated food production in the era of late colonial rule and decolonization. 
But, drawing mainly on French colonial legal sources, I also suggest that the 
local political-economic life of phosphate, whether in Gafsa in Tunisia or on the 
Oulad Abdoun plateau in Morocco, emerged in close connection to other trans-
Maghreb and trans-imperial sites of the phosphate archipelago, as juris-
prudential models flowed back and forth, often via the central legitimizing legal 
and political institutions in Paris.  
2  Archipelagos 
The spatial and analytical concept of the archipelago is a venerable one in the 
social scientific and historical literature across diverse subfields, and my usage 
here is inspired by developments of the idea by scholars as diverse as J.G.A. 
|| 
10–Camprubí, Resource Geopolitics, p. 677. 
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Pocock, Vanessa Ogle and Tom Boellstorff.11 Rooted in the geographical notion 
of a set of physical islands more or less related by proximity or shared geo-
logical characteristics, the concept has served to navigate across existing ana-
analytic boundaries, often national, in historical and social scientific literatures. 
By allowing for the identification of shared characteristics or mutually con-
stitutive dynamic inter-connections between non-contiguous spaces, the 
metaphor of the archipelago helps us develop historical interpretations that are 
not reliant on the presupposition of sharp external boundaries – whether 
between nations, empires, or at the edge of mining towns – and yet are still able 
to recognize and describe “islands of difference”.12 
In the case of phosphates, an archipelagic approach allows us to trace inter-
connections and similarities between specific sites of extraction and con-
sumption, which helped detach such sites from their immediate surroundings to 
a degree, while also recognizing the durable embedding of each individual site 
in proximate social and political contexts, for example in terms of labour 
politics or geology. In addition, by identifying a “phosphate archipelago” we 
can trace a network of relationships that links not just sites within North Africa 
but that also connects the Pacific phosphate islands with those of North Africa.13 
Such a view places into transversal dialogue regional systems usually treated by 
historians within separate vertical systems of imperial exploitation. From the 
point of view of commodity chain analysis, moreover, an archipelagic frame-
work insists on the salience of sub-oceanic and sub-imperial systems of extrac-
tion, even as such systems contributed to the elaboration of larger entities, 
including “global” commodity chains.14  
Let us examine these possibilities in greater detail. First, laying an archipel-
agic cartography of interconnected insularity onto the superficially contiguous 
climatic, imperial and national spaces of twentieth century North Africa re-
problematizes and integrates the history of phosphate mining in North Africa 
|| 
11–J.G.A. Pocock, British History. A Plea for a New Subject, in: The Journal of Modern History 
47, 1975, pp. 601-21. Pocock argues for an understanding of British history in terms of an Atlan-
tic archipelago rather than the British Isles alone. See also Vanessa Ogle’s groundbreaking cur-
rent research project on tax havens and de-territorialized offshore political economy in the 
twentieth century, which identifies the inter-relationship between varied sites of off-shore 
fiscal politics in both continental and insular tax jurisdictions: Archipelago Capitalism: Tax 
Havens, Eurodollars, and the Other International Political Economy, 1870s-1980s.  
12–T. Boellstorff, The Gay Archipelago. Sexuality and Nation in Indonesia, Princeton 2005, p. 7. 
13–Thanks to Mat Paskins for helping me on this point. 
14–G.T. Cushman, Guano and the Opening of the Pacific World. A Global Ecological History, 
New York 2013, p. 19; S.C. Topik/A. Wells, Commodity Chains in a Global Economy, in: E.S. 
Rosenberg et al. (Eds.), A World Connecting. 1870-1945 Cambridge MA 2012, pp. 685-815. 
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with the paradigmatic case of the Pacific. Gafsa and Khouribga are brought into 
dialogue with much-studied island sites such as Nauru or Banaba. This is im-
portant because the spectacularly devastated ecologies of the Pacific’s island 
mines, the notorious labour regimes and displacements inflicted on their indig-
indigenous peoples, and their coeval relationship with trans-Pacific settler 
agriculture and colonial-era international law have made of them, thus far, the 
pre-dominant site of analysis for historicization of phosphate mining.15 But this 
pre-eminence has also detached the Pacific phosphate islands from wider 
connections, even in studies as epistemologically and methodologically innova-
tive as Katerina Martina Teaiwa’s recent work on Banaba/Ocean Island. Teaiwa 
simply notes, for instance, the simultaneous re-institutionalization of post-war 
imperial mining in North Africa and the Pacific in 1920:  
“the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom bought out the 
Pacific Phosphate Company and created the British Phosphate Commissioners (BPC), 
tasked with mining Nauru and Ocean Island in the Pacific and, later, Christmas Island in 
the Indian Ocean. Across the seas, the Cherifian Phosphates Board […] today the world’s 
major phosphate supplier, was established in Morocco in the same year.”16  
The network of insular cultures and extractive economies associated with Pacific 
phosphate mining therefore offers a new way to think about North African 
phosphates as an archipelago. And this in its turn helps us dialogically rethink 
the much heralded possibilities of the Pacific Ocean as a unit of historical and 
economic geography.17 Such a trans-global nexus has precedents: as Joel Barnes 
has lately pointed out, J.G.A. Pocock’s own concept of Britain within an 
“Atlantic archipelago” was dialogical, drawing explicitly on Australasian 
insular networks to theorize “a network of relationships in which each part was 
envisaged as another self of all the others”, and placing the Pacific world into a 
clear dialogue with comparable dynamics at work elsewhere.18 Khouribga and 
Nauru are, in this sense, not so far apart. 
|| 
15–M. Williams/B. Macdonald, The Phosphateers. A History of the British Phosphate Commis-
sioners and the Christmas Island Phosphate Commission, Melbourne 1985; K.M. Teaiwa, 
Consuming Ocean Island. Stories of People and Phosphate from Banaba, Bloomington 2014; A. 
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge  2007, p. 2; 
C.N. McDaniel/J.M. Gowdy, Paradise for Sale. A Parable of Nature, Berkeley 2000. 
16–Teaiwa, Consuming Ocean Island, p. 1. 
17–D. Armitage/A. Bashford (Eds.), Pacific Histories. Ocean, Land, People, Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York 2014; S. Perera, Australia and the Insular Imagination. 
Beaches, Borders, Boats, and Bodies, New York 2009. 
18–J. Barnes, The View from the Margins: John Pocock and the Antipodean Origins of Four 
Nations History, in: Four Nations History Network, https://fournationshistory.wordpress.com/ 
 The Phosphate Achipelago    |    193 
I turn now to the question of blurred frontiers and insular difference in an 
archipelagic analysis. The concept of a phosphate archipelago emphasizes 
spaces of extraction and production that were both locally embedded in socially 
and politically influential hinterlands, and yet increasingly resembled one 
another through the intensive exchange of knowledge, labour and technologi-
cal practices. This allows us to think about phosphate extraction not simply as 
an aspect of imperial ecology, and then a key force in the spatial production of 
post-imperial nation-states like Morocco, but as a sustained networked regional 
system. This system connected simultaneously “upward” into imperial and 
global scales of industrial agriculture, and “downward” into national and local 
social and productive systems. In other words an archipelagic geography draws 
to our attention the role of specific dynamics of exchange and similarities of 
practice in building up shared characteristics across a regional scale of economic 
life that intermediates between more familiar national, imperial or global units.  
In North Africa, where post-independence borders rapidly became critical 
sites of national state building, inter-state dispute and political-economic 
arbitrage, the alternative spatialization and the questioning of naturalized 
imperial – and then national – economic spaces is useful.19 In this way the 
phosphate archipelago productively reframes the spatial geography of colonial 
North Africa, in a vein recently suggested by Judith Scheele and James 
McDougall. Influenced by the theorization of maritime space, they have pre-
sented the Sahara as a region defined by its logics of sustained communication, 
which means, in keeping with an archipelagic view, that “regions can some-
times include places situated at considerable distances from one another while 
excluding neighbouring areas”.20 In the case of the phosphate archipelago, 
which connects to a global agro-chemical commodity chain, the importance of 
following actors across political boundaries is still more relevant. As Mimi Sheller 
has lately shown, for example, in the case of transnational networks of 
aluminium production and consumption, “internal cultural contestations and 
rhetorical frames” are inadequate to understanding the relation of a commodity 
to a given imperial polity (in that case the United States). Instead we need to 
look at “wider cultures of technological regimes, embeddedness in institutions 
… global struggles for economic and military predominance, and competition 
|| 
2015/09/28/the-view-from-the-margins-john-pocock-and-the-antipodean-origins-of-four-nations- 
history/; 5/10/2015. 
19–See for example J. McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria, 
Cambridge 2006. 
20–J. McDougall/J. Scheele (Eds.), Saharan Frontiers. Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa, 
Bloomington IN 2012, p. 13. 
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with other transnational actors and industries for resources, energy and la-
labour.”21  
Finally, the concept of the phosphate archipelago, with its emphasis on the 
mutual influences between sites where phosphate rock was mined in North 
Africa, forces a focus on the social-natural production of agrochemical – and 
specifically phosphate – circuits. We might think of this as part of what 
Theodore R. Schatzki calls a ‘practice-arrangement nexus’: in this case the 
nexus of interlaced mining practices and geological arrangements that 
characterized them.22 The result is to render rock phosphate somewhat less of an 
external resource – as the narrative of peak phosphorous would have it, one 
discovered in more or less well-known circumstances of colonial exploitation 
and agro-chemical epochal rupture, exploited, and then exhausted or (perhaps) 
husbanded. Without denying the importance of phosphate’s role in the shift to 
“input-intensive farming practices based on one-way patterns of production, 
consumption and waste”, an archipelagic view of interconnected Phophatvilles 
helps us to position phosphates as a contingent co-actor in the production of 
extractive spaces and agro-chemical systems. 23 The phosphate archipelago 
concept thereby reduces the analytical subordination of a dispersed chain of 
comparably operating local spaces of extraction to a powerfully moralized 
historiographical narrative focused on the unsustainable industrial exploitation 
of inert “natural” resources.24 
3  Gafsa: Heart of the Archipelago  
In 1900, as scholars of settler colonial agriculture and Pacific history have 
noted, rock phosphate extraction, for example on the Great Barrier Reef, was 
already proliferating as guano resources fell away: twelve coral mines opened 
off the Queensland coast that year, to console the increasingly acidic soils in the 
|| 
21–M. Sheller, Aluminum Dreams. The Making of Light Modernity, Cambridge MA 2014, p. 8. 
22–T.R. Schatzki, Nature and Technology in History, in: History and Theory 42, 2003, pp. 82-93. 
23–Cushman, Guano and the Opening of the Pacific World, p. 52; see for a Marxist approach to 
this change B. Clark/J.B. Foster, Ecological Imperialism and the Global Metabolic Rift Unequal 
Exchange and the Guano/Nitrates Trade, in: International Journal of Comparative Sociology 
50, 2009, pp. 311-34; F.M.L. Thompson, The Second Agricultural Revolution, 1815-1880, in: The 
Economic History Review, New Series, 21,1968, pp. 62-77. 
24–Sheller, Aluminum Dreams. The Making of Light Modernity; for such a narrative see M. 
Levene, Climate Blues. Or How Awareness of the Human End Might Re-Instil Ethical Purpose to 
the Writing of History, in: Environmental Humanities 2, 2013, pp. 153-73.  
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onshore hinterland.25 The farmers of that Australian state, and their dealers in 
the fertilizer industry, trailed behind their counterparts in another settler-
influenced imperial formation however: French North Africa. By 1900 the min-
mining basin of Gafsa in central Tunisia was already an established phosphate 
production centre and, as the oldest node of the North African phosphate archi-
pelago, it would play a paradigmatic role in the massive regional expansion of 
phosphate rock production over the following decades.26  
The Gafsa mines’ operation rapidly produced fatal effects as demand 
swelled, and it is worth examining this fact in empirical detail, both to under-
underline the local and intimate forms of violence the mines fostered against 
mine workers in particular, and the forms of partiality governing the colonial 
archive in this respect.27 On October 30th 1900, at the Gafsa mine of Metlaouï, 
operated by the Compagnie des Phosphates et du Chemin de Fer de Sfax-Gafsa 
(CPG), the dominant Tunisian phosphate company, the pillars holding up the 
roof of the mine galleries collapsed, causing large blocks of limestone rock to 
fall through several levels of the mine along a distance of more than 200 metres. 
Outside the mine a deep rumble was heard around 12:10 pm, and a white cloud 
gouted from all the gallery entrances, followed over the next ten minutes by the 
noise of further collapses. Though a few were pulled living from the mine, the 
disaster killed 32 men, all “Arabs or Sicilians”, whose names, symptomatically, 
figure only briefly in the colonial state’s account.28 Some 27 of the dead were 
buried underground, under tons of limestone and phosphate ore, and a further 
34 were injured.29 
|| 
25–B. Daley/P. Griggs, Mining the Reefs and Cays. Coral, Guano and Rock Phosphate 
Extraction in the Great Barrier Reef, Australia, 1844-1940, in: Environment and History 12, 
2006, pp. 395-433. Frank Uekötter drew my attention to this article. See also on guano’s limited 
impact on British farming Cushman, Guano and the Opening of the Pacific World, p. 51  
26–On Protectorate Tunisia’s political structure and the Beylical state see M.D Lewis, Divided 
Rule. Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-1938, Berkeley 2013. 
27–For an introduction to the CPG see N. Dougui, Histoire d’une grande entreprise coloniale. 
La Compagnie des phosphates et du chemin de fer de Gafsa, 1897-1930, Tunis 1995. 
28–On this general topic see A.L. Stoler, Along the Archival Grain. Epistemic Anxieties and 
Colonial Common Sense, Princeton 2009. By the 1920s Italian workers in the Tunisian 
phosphate mines were often there as part of a French-Italian deal that exchanged labour for 
phosphate supplies. See the Unione newspaper of Tunis, July 5th 1923, The Truth about 
Tripolitan Phosphates, which reported that since almost none of the mineral had been found in 
Italian Libya, there was a deal in place to export Tunisian phosphate to Italy in exchange for 
Italian labour sent to the Tunisian mines. 
29–Diplomatic Archives Nantes, France, (CADN), 1TU/1/V/Carton 1278: Concession des 
Phosphates de Gafsa, 1896-1919, Mine de Metlaoui, Catastrophe du 30 Octobre 1900, Rapport 
de l’Ingenieur des Mines. 
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The Director-General of the CPG, a French engineer named Prost, rushed to 
the site by train, to assist in the search and rescue operation. But after a couple 
of days, he committed suicide as described in a lengthy judicial account in the 
colonial archive that contrasts illustratively with the very brief discussion of the 
miners killed in the collapse:  
“He left Metlaouï on the 8 November, on the morning train headed for Sfax where he was 
supposed to embark for France. Arriving at the station at Meknassi, half way to Sfax, 
around nine in the morning, Mr Prost got off the train during the halt at the station, wrote 
a few words on a sheet of paper, took a few steps down the platform, and suddenly, such 
that no-one could anticipate his intention, threw himself beneath the wheels of a train 
manoeuvring in the station; he was killed instantly.”30 
Prost’s suicide became the lens through which the colonial authorities investi-
investigated the case, seeking to protect his and his family’s reputation and 
forestall legal challenges by vindicating the technical management of the mine. 
The prosecutor’s office, in its presentation of the facts of the Metlaouï collapse 
to the Minister of Justice, emphasized the rigour with which the Company 
followed the safety protocols prescribed by the Tunisian Public Works 
Administration. Interrogated by the investigating magistrate, the consensus of 
the witnesses, including master miners, stabilized around the idea that the 
collapse of the mine’s galleries had likely been provoked by a ‘slippage of 
phosphates’. The mining method employed, of ‘abandoned pillars’ – leaving 
supporting pillars behind to hold up the roof of the gallery as miners moved 
back out of exhausted galleries – was one of three standard procedures and had 
been approved by the Administration of Public Works in Tunisia. As official 
correspondence showed, it had been chosen in part because of the massive rock 
formations that characterized the geology at Metlaouï, as opposed to the lighter, 
crumbling phosphate rock type found at Tbessa just across the border in 
Algeria. At Tbessa the rock allowed for mining by “controlled collapse”, as 
pillars were removed by miners as they moved backwards down exhausted 
mine galleries, in a technique called “éboulement”. The phosphate ore and its 
geological arrangement therefore played a key, active role at Metlaouï. But 
“abandoned pillars” was also chosen as the mining technique at Metlaouï 
because of the engineers’ perception that miners in Tunisia were too in-
experienced to work with a third possible method – known as “remblayage” – 
|| 
30–CADN, 1TU/1/V/Carton 1278: Concession des Phosphates de Gafsa, 1896-1919, Parquet de 
la Cour d’Assises et du Tribunal de Sousse to Minister of Justice, Paris, January 7th 1901. All 
translations are the author’s own unless noted. 
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in which waste rubble was used to support the gallery roof as miners retreated 
from worked-out phosphate ore veins towards the surface.31 Despite this official 
vindication, Prost wrote in his suicide note, addressed to his subordinate Bur-
Bursaux, about the extension of the mine: “I declare that I acted senselessly and 
that neither you nor anyone else should be held responsible for the catastrophe 
caused by the method of exploitation followed. In extending (the mine) as it was 
after a limited and insufficient test, I committed the most monstrous act of 
madness ever made”.32  
Working methods such as the use of the “abandoned pillar” and “controlled 
collapse” techniques circulated not just across the border between the Tunisian 
Protectorate and the phosphate-rich adjacent south-eastern corner of the 
Algerian department of Constantine (administratively part of metropolitan 
France). Discussions of working methods also encompassed the French metro-
pole, such as the chalk mines of the Paris basin, and even iron mining in the 
United States. But in this network Gafsa, not least through its working methods, 
its control of its own rail line to the sea, and its political influence in Tunis and 
Paris, would become the paradigm for the phosphate archipelago across French 
North Africa, as rock phosphate production rapidly expanded in the first 
decades of the twentieth century. By 1913 Gafsa produced 1,355,103 tons a year 
and Tunisia as a whole some 2,071,772 tons, while French North Africa’s total 
was around 2,635,463 tons – second only as a world producer to the USA’s 
Florida and Tennessee mines, which produced 3,117,970 tons, substantially 
oriented to the domestic US market where North African phosphate went mainly 
to export.33 World consumption of rock phosphate on the eve of World War One 
was some 6,740,266 tons: the war, however, would durably re-institutionalize 
and powerfully extend the phosphate archipelago, in ways we now address.34 
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4  The Ties that Bind:  
Archipelagic Regional Connectivity 
The sites of the phosphate archipelago in North Africa were related to one an-
another through a connectivity that took various specific forms. Through these 
connections the spaces of the phosphate archipelago came to resemble one 
another, as islands of shared practice, sociability and politics, and thus to de-
detach themselves to a degree, but never entirely, from their surrounding 
regions. Of these forms of connectivity, the most fully discussed here will be the 
knowledge of legal experts, such as French lawyers specialized in mining and 
quarrying, whose views on North African phosphates furnish much of the evi-
evidence I rely on below. Their jurisprudence was not the only type in play, 
however. North African Islamic jurists, who pronounced on the granting of 
mining concessions in commonly held habous land in Tunisia, for example, also 
played important roles. But numerous other forms of connectivity also helped 
bind the archipelago. One was the heavily regulated but very considerable 
labour mobility of French engineers and of North African and Mediterranean 
miners, for instance drawing miners from the Moroccan Atlas mountains and 
from Algeria to Gafsa in the early years of the mine’s operation around 1900.35 
Another was political-economic cartelization across sites, despite the varied role 
of the state in individual mining concessions and practices. Massively stimu-
lated by World War One and by the initiation of new mines in Morocco, the 
North African phosphate archipelago gained renewed institutional form in a 
series of formal cartel arrangements in the interwar period, including the 
Comptoir de Phosphates de l’Afrique du Nord.36 These arrangements, although 
constantly disputed by the cartel members and dominated by Tunisian and 
Algerian firms, traversed the colonial frontiers of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, 
and became a major force in the French imperial agricultural and export 
economy. They also played a growing role in the world agricultural system, in-
cluding in the Pacific, as its products even reached Japan and New Zealand in 
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the 1920s.37 Finally the major North African mines also exchanged practices of 
spatial production, such as patterns of housing for workers, and of labour man-
management, such as the anthropometric registration of workers through 
fingerprinting.  
This continuing relationship to proximate hinterlands, and the deep im-
importance of intra-regional connections in the Maghreb, even as global 
networks deeply penetrated the region, supports  an archipelagic focus that can 
attend to North African spaces, as well as to the journey phosphates from mines 
there made outward across the globe. As E. Ann McDougall has argued, in a 
critique of analysis in which the global occludes rather than complements the 
regional, Saharan “transregional trade, with either Europe or Mediterranean 
North Africa, always had to tie back into regional patterns and connections in 
order to be sustainable. And these regions, while certainly responsive to outside 
influences, were Saharan in structure”.38 Equally, like the racialized spatial 
politics US oil firms transposed from Texas and Venezuela to the oil towns of 
Saudi Arabia, the North African phosphate centres were certainly “company 
towns” of a sort, in which mining companies set out to create similar 
environments and systems.39 But we should be cautious with this label: the 
phosphate islands of North Africa were also connected by far more than shared 
or similar corporate orders. The Phosphatvilles were crucibles of colonial and 
anti-colonial union activity, sites for experimentation and production of 
scientific knowledge about mining and miners, and strategic locations in rising 
nationalist campaigns. Though they resembled one another and were 
connected, as we have seen, by multiple forms of archipelagic connectivity, 
they also dramatically shaped the political economies of the Tunisian, Algerian, 
and Moroccan national state formations, and of the French imperial system at 
large before independence.40 And of course they fed the increasingly intense 
superphosphate-based fertilizer demand of a large part of global agriculture.  
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5  From War Materiel to Raw Material: 
Phosphatvilles and World War One  
Crucial to the expansion and legal-political consolidation of the archipelago 
was World War One. The war re-compartmentalized the relatively liberally im-
imbricated pre-1914 European continental economy, separating the French and 
German economies especially, and creating far stronger national economic 
spaces, influenced by the legacy of planned wartime production.41 Colonial 
officials and lobbies in all the European empires sought to leverage hostilities 
and the salience of colonial troops and resources to the war effort, to make the 
case for renewed colonial investment and for greater imperial self-sufficiency, at 
least in case of the advent of another conflict, which many deemed imminent.42 
Thus the British, for example, tried to make Mandate Palestine into a beacon of 
industrial development that would lead the British Middle East forward 
regionally as an imperial resource, by enhancing its port facilities and transport 
networks, and by establishing major potash mines on the Dead Sea that would 
be available to the imperial war effort in case of renewed hostilities.43 In the 
Pacific, as several historians have noted, phosphate islands such as Nauru were 
consolidated in Japanese, British, Australian and New Zealander hands, and 
through the British Phosphate Commission in 1919, which was established to 
exploit Nauru especially, settler crops in the otherwise ill-suited soils of 
Australia benefited particularly.44 
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For the French imperial state, anxious to secure continental security against 
Germany and concerned about their unreliable British and American former 
allies and current creditors, colonial resources proved appealing. The weakness 
of the franc and the failure to secure German reparations payments only made 
dollar and sterling denominated purchases of agricultural produce harder to 
stomach, against a backdrop of post-war trauma and civilizational angst.45 In 
his 1925 doctoral thesis on Algerian phosphates, which was one of several on 
the topic defended at the University of Paris Law Faculty in the years after 1918, 
René Goepfert built his case for expanded production of North African phos-
phosphate within precisely this conjuncture, invoking the spectre of Bolshevik 
demands for “bread and peace”: 
“Though powerfully rich in fertilizer, France does not produce enough wheat. She is 
forced to rely on special regulation and laws. She is a vassal of foreign countries. Through 
the influence of our poor exchange rate and the exploitation of foreigners, so cruel after 
our sacrifices, the wheat we import is ever more expensive, hauling upwards with it the 
price of both flour and bread. The price of bread is a symbol. It powerfully influences the 
vacillating and varied spirit of the masses. Exploited by unscrupulous ringleaders the 
rapid series of price rises could lead to more or less violent crisis.”46  
Goepfert justified a pivot towards imperial autarky by reference to the perceived 
internationalization of the grain market since the war. He quoted the Inter-
national Agricultural Institute in Rome as saying that, as opposed to the billion 
quintals of grain produced a year pre-1914, only 730 million had been produced 
in 1924. Citing the “inexorable” force of the law of “supply and demand” he 
argued that “France, in the interests of financial stability, has to become in-
dependent of the international market and become self-reliant. She can do it 
through her own production and with the contribution of her possessions in 
North Africa”.47 His argument, and others like it, would help to juridically and 
politically carve out the phosphate archipelago, and would reinforce forms of 
archipelagic connectivity that increasingly linked its constituent islands. 
Appraising French post-armistice agriculture, Goepfert acknowledged the 
transformative force of factors such as the war dead, the appeal of urban life to 
peasants who had first encountered it during the war, the fragmentation of 
French farmland and other issues. But he argued that the main factor holding 
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back French agriculture was technical method: fertilizer. “As one member of 
parliament noted recently ‘the treasure that fertilizes the field is less the sweat 
of the human brow than the sack of ammonia sulphate’ and we should add, of 
lime phosphate”. Goepfert lamented the high price of fertilizer, and France’s 
relative lack of fertilizer application (85 kg of phosphate fertilizer applied per 
hectare compared to Belgium’s 400 kg). He also worried about the difficulty 
farmers had in quantifying just how much extra crop production fertilizer would 
yield: “He knows that in doubling the quantity of fertilizer he doubles his 
expenditure, however he also knows he won’t double his production. But he 
knows he will increase it, and the day fertilizer will be cheap he won’t hesitate 
to use a lot and thus the product of the French soil will be considerably 
increased”.48 
As Frank Uekötter has shown, by the mid-1920s enthusiastic single-nutrient 
mass fertilization campaigns had frequently led to little increased crop produc-
tion. Such fiascos had prompted major agro-chemical firms, like IG Farben, to 
develop comprehensive nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium fertilizers, like 
Nitrophoska in 1927.49 In the absence of firm knowledge about precisely how 
crops absorbed nutrients, the strategy became to blanket them in all the main 
nutrient chemicals. Particularly at stake here, along the phosphate commodity 
chain from the sites of the phosphate archipelago in North Africa to crops 
around the world, was the question of how fertilizer increased agricultural 
production and to what extent. In this uncertain context, mining companies, 
industrial actors and their agents in politics and academia struggled to 
capitalize on the political situation to expand production and maintain the 
increased capacity of wartime plant created between 1914 and 1918.50  
In the absence of solid numbers, Goepfert resolved this dilemma through an 
economic rhetoric, pivoting around the concept of relative cost. Building on a 
clinching geopolitical argument about Germany’s superior pre-war phosphate 
and fertilizer-based production of potatoes (160 quintals produced per hectare 
to the French 90), he argued that: “Our country, to be self sufficient – and we’ve 
seen how essential that is – must considerably augment its consumption of 
fertilizer. But that won’t be possible until it is very cheap indeed”.51  
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Noting that his argument was focused not on the franc price of the product, 
but on its cost relative to – and as a fraction of – that of agricultural products such 
as wheat, Goepfert observed that with the return of Alsace-Lorraine after 1918, 
France had recovered a key source of potash salts, and that though some Chilean 
nitrates were still imported, North African phosphates completed the “NPK” trio 
of core fertilizing nutrients. Indeed the product of the North African archipelago 
would allow France not just to approach self-sufficiency, but, in an exception to 
autarkic strategy, to “claim first place in the world phosphate market”.  
Here Goepfert, against the backdrop of the colonial minister and former 
governor of Indochina Albert Sarraut’s wide-ranging political efforts at colonial 
mise en valeur in the 1920s, embraced a wider register that discursively sealed 
off the extraction and mining sites of the archipelago from any more compre-
hensive or industrial colonial developmental strategy.52 He asserted that since 
the lack of coal, water and electricity meant that Algeria “will never become an 
industrial country … it will have to limit itself to exploiting its mines and 
become the supplier of raw material to industrial countries”.53 In contributing to 
the reinforcement of archipelagic connections between the phosphate islands of 
French North Africa here, and arguing for their development as phosphate 
extraction sites, Goepfert also detached and differentiated them from their 
immediate regional and imperial hinterlands. Despite the lived reality of, for 
example, Gafsa’s embedment in the social and political dynamics of its region, 
Goepfert’s argument exacerbated the insularity and specificity of the archi-
pelago, seeking to deny the possibility of their integration into wider regional 
and even national spaces. Crucially it did so by insisting on natural resources as 
both crucial limiting factors and as a key form of imperial sovereignty, through 
which metropolitan hegemony was assured. 
Goepfert was scarcely alone in this point of view and we should emphasize 
the degree to which it was shared by the French colonial lobbies in the after-
math of the war, when the difficulties of industrial mobilization in 1915 were 
made the basis for arguments about the need for a deeper exploitation of 
colonial territories in terms of raw materials. Edmond du Vivier de Streel, a well-
connected colonial business publicist and lobbyist who would later become the 
President of the Moroccan Mining Commission in the 1930s, made a comparable 
argument in a series of wartime pamphlets of 1916 and 1917. He argued that: 
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“If there is one mistake that for the last quarter century has falsified our political economy 
it is our neglect of the problems of production and consumption in favour of the question 
of the division of wealth, without ever imagining that the problem of division of wealth 
can only be solved to general satisfaction by facing the problems of production and 
through low prices for the consumer”54 
De Streel, an admirer of large Anglo-American concerns such as the United Fruit 
Company and Standard Oil, argued for the use of large corporations with 
powerful state backing. He ridiculed free market economic doctrines of compe-
tition as unviable in a post-armistice world of harsh international competition 
and limited resources. Looking forward to the role of the French colonies in 
providing raw materials and cheap goods after the war, he constantly compared 
such raw materials to the war materiel the French Army had painfully lacked in 
1915, and concluded: “we must say and repeat that our economic victory 
depends on the economic development of our colonial empire – and can only be 
guaranteed by that empire”55  
De Streel and Goepfert therefore shared an emphasis on imperial autarky, 
produced through the expanded consumption, across the metropolitan social 
classes, of goods made cheap by cheap colonial raw material.56 Large private 
companies with state backing would exploit those raw materials, phosphate 
among them. The role of the state was a complex one in these accounts, since it 
was to be deeply engaged in providing legal support and infrastructural 
investment, and yet would not excessively interfere in markets. Goepfert 
addressed the issue directly in terms of phosphate mining when discussing a 
March 1921 meeting at the Ministry of Public Works. At the meeting, optimistic 
production figures and the Moroccan hope soon to produce a “technically 
unlimited tonnage able to supply as much as the world needed”, combined with 
low global demand projections, had encouraged a decision to cap production. 
Cartelization and limiting the development of new mines became the order of 
the day. Goepfert lamented this turn, seeking expanded production instead. He 
conceded that overproduction might lead to the collapse of producing 
companies, and then to an abusive oligopoly or monopoly of the producers. He 
acknowledged the risk of an unemployment crisis in such a situation, and of 
possible extra burdens on the state. But he saw underproduction as the greater 
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risk, and warned against the impact high prices and the slow expansion of the 
North African archipelago could have on imperial agriculture.57 
6  Khouribga:  
The Rise of the “Big Island” 
In this view of Moroccan phosphate production, Goepfert was more sanguine 
than some. Anticipating its status as the global swing producer later in the 
twentieth century, Moroccan phosphate mining quickly troubled the historic 
producers of the phosphate archipelago in Algeria and Tunisia with its startling 
vitality. Mining in Morocco was controlled by the French imperial state through 
the Cherifian Phosphates Office (OCP), a state-backed monopoly controlled by 
the Protectorate government in Rabat, but operated on commercial principles 
by its management. As its production sky-rocketed, a special supplement of the 
French newspaper Le Temps of 1925 wondered, in a manner representative of 
the wave of anxiety mainly sponsored by the Algerian and Tunisian private 
phosphateers, “what space will remain on the European market for Algerian 
and Tunisian phosphates, overwhelmed by a state industry created with capital 
provided by metropolitan or colonial taxpayers and without any concern for 
profit margin and uninfluenced by needing to make a return on capital?”58 None 
of this troubled Goepfert however. He advanced several factors to refute the 
perceived threat from Khouribga. Under-developed production facilities, the 
possibility of sending the Moroccan surplus to South America, Morocco’s own 
potential phosphate consumption as a settler agricultural country of the future, 
and finally the fact that it had started by exploiting its richest mines, which 
would be exhausted first, all militated, as he argued, against worrying about 
Moroccan overproduction.59  
This anxious relationship of the historic Algero-Tunisian (and to a lesser 
degree French Pacific/Makatea-focused) private mining companies to state action, 
and in particular to the meteoric rise of the OCP in the 1920s and 1930s, was an 
essential part of the French juridical and political-economic expertise that 
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helped shape the phosphate archipelago, due to the close relationship between 
colonial business interests and metropolitan commercial law specialists.60  
Another doctoral dissertation written at the Paris Law Faculty, three years 
after Goepfert’s, reflects this. On an early June day in 1928, under the eyes of an 
examining committee made up of jurists expert in commercial and tax law and 
supportive of business, Roger Chapus explained his research, which was fo-
cused not on Algeria, like Goepfert, but on the “Exploitation of Phosphates in 
Morocco: the Cherifian Phosphate Office”.61 Nevertheless, his story continued 
that sketched by Goepfert. Mining had, as we have seen, begun on the Oulad 
Abdoun plateau only in March 1921, but as Chapus already noted, in 1927 alone 
1.2 million tons of phosphate had passed along the military railways of the Pro-
tectorate and embarked at Casablanca’s increasingly mechanized, 500 metre long 
phosphates pier,62 bound for the booming world market in superphosphate-
based agricultural commodities, especially fertilizer. Chapus’s exposition, in 
keeping with his disciplinary commitments, was largely focused on providing a 
juridical analysis of the Moroccan Phosphate industry. But, in a fashion reveal-
ing the disciplinary hegemony of law and the political hegemony of state engi-
neers in the French 1920s, Chapus had also spent time at Khouribga as an engi-
neer, and his thesis had a political-economic chord.63 This was expressed 
notably in its hostility to the OCP’s quasi-public institutional structure, con-
trolled by the Moroccan authorities under the aegis of the French Resident-
General, Hubert Lyautey.64  
In Chapus’s eyes, this system was a result of the “influence of syndicalist 
and socialistic” – legacies of wartime collectivization from 1914-1918. But it also 
emerged in his view from an anti-liberal state concern to extract taxes and fiscal 
benefits from the mine, in light of the profits that the state had handed to pri-
|| 
60–Jackson, What is Syria Worth?; on French political-economy see M. Fourcade, Economists 
and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 
1990s, Princeton 2009, p. 11. 
61–Chapus’committee was led by Louis Germain-Martin, a jurist at the Paris Faculty of Law, 
an expert in public finance, banking and taxation, a future Minister of Finance in numerous 
governments of the 1930s, a defender of big business against the Popular Front in 1936 and a 
Vichy government official. See M. Lescure/A. Plessis, Banques locales et banques régionales en 
Europe au XXe siècle, Paris 2004, p. 262 
62–J. Du Taillis, Le Nouveau Maroc, Paris 1923, pp. 286-287. 
63–On varieties of mining engineer see T.J. LeCain, Mass Destruction. The Men and Giant Mines 
That Wired America and Scarred the Planet, New Brunswick N.J., 2009, p. 129. 
64–On Chapus at Khouribga see ANOM, FR ANOM 123COL161/21, Ministère des Colonies. École 
coloniale, puis École nationale de la France d'outre-mer, Fonds des mémoires des élèves, 
Francis Just Louis Jean Nicolas, Les phosphates du Maroc (1931/1932), Biliography. 
 The Phosphate Achipelago    |    207 
vate concessionaires before World War One in the older, established islands of 
the phosphate archipelago, especially at Gafsa.65 And indeed Lyautey himself 
was on the record as saying, in an established vein of colonial economic rheto-
ric that obscured the colonizer’s own interest, that ‘Morocco will keep and im-
mediately exploit its own phosphates. Foreign competitors will only complicate, 
slow and muddle simple things’.66 Though they were ‘foreign’ in a complex 
sense, he surely had the masters of the Tunisian and Algerian outposts of the 
phosphate archipelago in mind. 
But Chapus did not just engage in black-letter jurisprudential argument and 
swipes at state socialism. He gave a brief explanation of phosphate’s role in 
plant and soil life cycles. And he anticipated the recent historiographical em-
phasis on agrochemical epochal rupture by asserting the momentous conse-
quences of the de-localization of the nitrogen and nitrate cycle through the 
massive geographical transfer of agricultural products across the planet. This 
pivotal shift, Chapus argued, “requir(ed) a restitution” of the soil’s nutrient 
balance through mineral fertilizer and was a question, he added portentously, 
“about which we have only preoccupied ourselves for less than a century”.67 
Though focused in the main on Khouribga’s rise as a component of the North 
African phosphate archipelago, Chapus thereby also attended to the rise of a 
global network of phosphate extraction and consumption, and to the links be-
tween the two, as expressed by French imperial sovereignty. He therefore pro-
vided a brief and picaresque commodity genealogy, vulgarizing for policy and 
academic use the career of nitrate fertilizer as an agent of global agricultural 
history. In it Chapus jumped rapidly from the thriving Roman markets in bird 
droppings to the Inca death penalty imposed on those who killed guano-
producing birds. In the modern era he noted the ruthlessness of the English 
powdered bone merchants, who scavenged for their raw material even on the 
Napoleonic battlefields of Leipzig and Waterloo, and finally the impetus this 
British skulduggery gave to “sentimental Germany”, inspiring Liebig to his 
transformative advocacy of agro-chemistry. The latter gave birth to the super-
phosphate industry, that “intermediary between the mine that produces phos-
phate and the agriculture that consumes it”.68 Such a narrative not only provid-
ed accessible talking points for phosphate’s advocates in Paris politics, but gave 
the French phosphate system a prestigious world historical pedigree. 
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Such distant ancestors were less useful for detailed examples of the legal 
structure of extractive spaces, and in Chapus’s legal analysis of Moroccan phos-
phates in their infancy, precedents from around the French colonial system of 
the nineteenth century abounded instead. These were generally selected to 
justify the superiority of private enterprise as against the clumsy hand of the 
state-as-industrialist. Mines and quarries in New Caledonia, Indochina, Oceania 
and Guyana were all shown to be open to private capital – so long as it took 
legal form under French law. These colonial mines had been dug, in Chapus’s 
view, by global capital, but they were propped up and held open by distinc-
tively French legal codes. The role of the state here was to provide robust legal, 
infrastructural and political-economic frameworks, and then to allow business 
to proceed. This would secure the French national interest without restraining 
the impact of private enterprise. 
The prime reference point for Chapus’ comparative jurisprudence of phos-
phate mining came from Gafsa, the oldest “island” of the North African phos-
phate archipelago. By 1926 Tunisia, as we have seen above, was the producer of 
some 2.7 million of the 9 million tons of mineral phosphate extracted globally. 
Chapus elaborated on Gafsa’s history since phosphate was first discovered there 
in 1885. He noted that after a decade of concession building and arbitration, 
Gafsa was in 1898 reframed using jurisprudence on colonial mining established 
in Algeria, considered for these purposes as part of the French metropole. Here 
again we see how the local political-economic life of phosphate, whether in 
Gafsa or Khouribga, emerged in close connection to other trans-Maghreb and 
trans-imperial sites of the phosphate archipelago, as legal and political-econo-
mic frameworks were transposed back and forth, often via the central legitimiz-
ing legal and political institutions in Paris. The comparative dimension of such 
transpositions was crucial, and indeed the tabulation of differences between the 
phosphate “islands” of North Africa, often based on their local geologies and 
socio-political hinterlands, intensified the comparative endeavour, thereby uni-
fying the archipelago as a set of similar spaces. The Gafsa sites, for instance, 
were formally considered quarries by the relevant French jurisprudence, where-
as the Moroccan sites became legal mines: such distinctions allowed commenta-
tors like Chapus to spin an ever-denser discursive web between the two. In Cha-
pus’ eyes, the long process of legal framing and re-framing at Gafsa was in-
tended to establish the Beylical (the Tunisian political authority) and French 
imperial state’s primacy against any prior prospectors’ claims. The use of the 
Algerian model in 1898, for example, secured the Protectorate state’s prerogative 
in adjudicating the right to prospect, the right to establish a concession, and the 
right to levy a royalty per ton exported regardless of the frequently decisive 
variation in transport and shipping costs. Major disputes had indeed arisen in 
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Tunisia in the 1890s over these issues, as in the case of the Kalaa-Djerda phos-
phate deposits north of Gafsa. There a legal dispute ran for several years over 
ownership of the deposits between rival mining entrepreneurs, who had worked 
with tribal groups and Islamic juridical consultants in the region to construct 
different legal claims to the concessionary exploitation of common habous 
lands.69 Islamic legal opinions given by these consultants had catered to their 
clients’ interests but also insisted on the short term of any concessions, for just a 
handful of years, effectively binding the phosphate mines into their adjacent 
religious and socio-political spaces. By borrowing the Algerian jurisprudential 
framework, the imperial state tried to overcome Islamic opinion on habous land, 
and sought to insulate the Tunisian phosphate sites from their surrounding 
regions, instead placing them into an imperial, pan-North African archipelago.70  
Further stitching together Gafsa and the rise of Khouribga, Chapus noted in 
passing that in late 1912 it had been a certain Monsieur Combelas, a former 
French assistant pharmacist who had practiced in Gafsa but then opened a 
“mechanical bakery” in Khouribga, who first recognized the presence of phos-
phates around “native wells” there and reported it to the local authorities. By 
1921 this circulation of amateur mineralogical knowledge from Gafsa to Morocco, 
one acquired not in the mine itself but in an ancillary settler-commercial role in 
the mining town, had been upgraded. In that year Resident-General Lyautey 
recruited an experienced phosphate engineer from Gafsa as the Director-General 
of the OCP.71 Indeed the physical paradigms of Gafsa phosphates were every-
where at Khouribga. Thus the relative cost of Moroccan phosphate per ton, in 
Chapus’ analysis, derived from its physical properties assessed by comparison 
with the Gafsa baseline. This involved, for example, the high calcium phosphate 
content of the ore at Khouribga, and its readily exploitable physical presentation 
in granular, dust or sandy format as opposed to the harder-to-treat massive rock 
ore found at Gafsa or in Algeria. It also meant the specificities of its geological 
arrangement. The new Moroccan sites delivered a thick, exploitable layer, 1.6 
metres deep on average, secreted in a surrounding envelope of more or less rich 
phosphate deposits some 60 metres deep. It was this ‘layer number one’ that 
was most apt for immediate exploitation, though Chapus speculated that in the 
future, layers with a lower phosphate content might also become exploitable, 
depending on costs. Here the phosphate itself, far from existing merely as a 
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natural resource, influenced the mix of local specificity and archipelagic simi-
larity developing between the Phosphatvilles. And indeed, as Chapus guessed, 
Khouribga would eventually become a mainly open-mining site, as technological 
change and the introduction of massive digging and shovelling systems, well 
adapted to the demands of Khouribga’s rich dust, altered the possibilities and 
re-configured the mine, the environment of which it was an inseparable part, as 
of the North-African archipelago it increasingly dominated.72  
Such forms of geological and political-economic knowledge allowed for 
comparison between sites in the archipelago, and thereby fostered their connec-
tivity as a distinct set of archipelagic spaces. And yet the archipelago could 
never be made perfectly distinct from its adjacent spaces, and efforts to do so 
produced both knowledge and irreducible uncertainties – even foundational 
types of ignorance. As Frank Uekotter and Robert Proctor have noted, specific 
forms of ignorance, often coeval with knowledge production, have their own 
politics, and Chapus’s agnotology was no exception.73 Producing comparable 
data across phosphate producing contexts, and forcing the specificities of the 
phosphate ore or socio-political context in each node of the archipelago into a 
manipulable and comparable abstraction required simplification of complex 
transport infrastructure, and of the power relationships between mining author-
ities, the state and the workforce in different places. Such hard-to-measure, 
even unknowable factors, just as much as more easily quantifiable phenomena 
as the world price of phosphate or the exchange rate situation, determined the 
potential of Moroccan phosphates in Chapus’ view.  
7  Conclusion 
Goepfert and Chapus were French colonial jurists, engineers and mining ex-
perts, and though their contributions were one of the forms of connectivity 
binding the sites of the phosphate archipelago, there were many others. In clos-
ing it is worth turning to another form, the labour migration of miners, in order 
to restore the workers, such as those killed at Metlaouï, to the centre of the stage 
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from which the colonial archive tends to remove them. In his work Chapus not-
ed that drought had struck Gafsa region in the mid-1920s.74 Although for his 
purposes this meant that the CPG’s agricultural revenues were likely to be small 
compared to its mining activity, the drought affected a local workforce in the 
Gafsa region that for many years had divided its time between pastoralism and 
mine work, herding livestock and resisting the mining industry’s coercive disci-
plines. Here phosphates played into a nexus of climate shifts and controlled 
migratory flux in the 1920s. But the Gafsa miners, partly because of their com-
mitment to farming, had never supplied the entire workforce underground. 
From the 1890s and 1900s, the Gafsa mines had drawn their workforce largely 
from Algerian Kabylia – and indeed from Morocco itself. Algerian Kabyles, for 
instance, represented some 80% of the workforce in 1914. But these workers 
eventually departed, taking their expertise to other mines – the coal districts in 
the north of postwar, demographically decimated France in the 1920s. This 
factor, as well as drought, population rises, and the access to consumer goods 
afforded by a regular miner’s salary and access to credit in company stores, all 
operated to intensify the lure of the phosphate island as a semi-detached but 
powerfully influential space in the Gafsa region.  
But again, this detachment remained incomplete. Phosphate miners in the 
Gafsa region continued to work in harvest seasons as farmers in the 1920s, cre-
ating a seasonal flux to mining output. The CPG sought to overcome this by 
continually draining trained miners from across the French colonial Maghreb, 
and later from Fascist Italy, as part of work-for-phosphate deals. These recruit-
ing tactics intensified the archipelago’s connections with other mining sites, but 
still did not allow the Gafsa basin to escape from the specificities of socio-
political practice in its adjacent region: the archipelago’s surrounding hinter-
lands influenced the situation of each of its constituent islands. Tribal (Arch’) 
loyalties and clan (laa’rouch) structures continued to make labour organizing 
around the phosphate mine at Gafsa a mirror of pre-existing affiliations in the 
interwar period and on into the 1940s and 1950s – even as the mine forced those 
older loyalties to rearticulate themselves. Hiring decisions, for example, hap-
pened on a quota basis proportionate to tribal weight in the region, and, as the 
miners’ union grew in force, a mining monoculture developed which was pro-
gressively tribalized via the medium of labour organization, especially as au-
tonomous unions began to emerge in the 1930s and 1940s.75 The labour regime 
at Gafsa became a hybrid of union organization and contestation, with connec-
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tions to metropolitan labour politics, and of older tribal structures that adapted 
themselves to the structures and opportunities of industrial extraction. 
In Morocco, likewise, migratory labour from the Atlas mountains and the 
coastal cities such as Casablanca became a key aspect of the development of the 
OCP mines at Khouribga and later at Louis-Gentil (Youssoufia after indepen-
dence). In the 1920s, these migrant workers interacted with corporate labour 
policies reflecting the racialized settler administration of the protecttorate, in 
which European and “indigenous” workers were treated very differently. Mo-
roccan miners quickly developed techniques for circumventing and adapting 
aspects of the regime however. For example, since Moroccan miners were re-
cruited on the basis of a few stated details (name, age, region etc.) and given a 
numbered metal token which was indexed to their personal entry in the register 
of miners, a secondary market in these tokens rapidly developed. Miners avoid-
ed reclaiming the deposit levied on the token, preferring to re-sell it, confident 
that their European supervisors could not identify them. Only with the introduc-
tion of basic anthropometric recruitment in the 1930s (fingerprinting), did the 
registered labour force begin to coincide to any degree with the people actually 
working in the mines. Even then, considerable re-sale markets for workers’ 
anthropometric paperwork flourished. In the 1950s OCP corporate paternalism 
increasingly informed the Moroccan phosphate islands until the eve of inde-
pendence, and the conditions of the OCP labour force were used to make a case 
for the welfarist modernism of late colonial rule, as they were across late coloni-
al Africa as development shaded into decolonization.76 In more recent decades, 
related battles between the state production of insular phosphate spaces and 
contestatory labour and national politics have emerged at the Bu-Craa mines in 
Western Sahara, which the Moroccan state turned into “a military camp trav-
ersed by sand walls, stones, and barbed wire installed to protect the phosphate” 
in a context of rising Polisario Front insurgency where some of the “most politi-
cally active groups were to found among Bu-Craa native workers”.77 
Historians of colonial empire have often focused on metropole-colony rela-
tions as a binary relationship, or on the rise of anti-colonial nationalism in the 
different nation-states of the formerly colonized world, treating political-
economy in terms of the aggregate levels of exploitation and tax burden, the 
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political weight of major companies and so on.78 But by placing phosphates 
themselves at the centre of the analysis, and by tracing the phosphate archipel-
ago across the borders of colonial territories and later national states this binary 
tendency can be nuanced. The phosphate archipelago, while remaining distinc-
tively North African in its imperial and then national dynamics, transmitted 
phosphate from the various extractive spaces towards a network of ports and 
out to a global distribution and consumption chain far beyond the metropole-
colony relationship, as input-intensive one-way industrial agriculture, based on 
fertilizer and engineered seed, exploded in the era of late colonial rule, the 
Green Revolution and decolonization.  
At the same time, by placing the environmental history of phosphate more 
squarely into the political and colonial history of French North Africa, for ex-
ample in the context of the resource jurisprudence provoked by neo-Malthusian 
and autarkic thinking after World War One, phosphate as an actor – not a mere 
natural resource – provides a way to bring the tools of environmental history 
into play in wider historiographical problematics. Much work remains to be 
done, for example on the lived experience of phosphate mining for North Afri-
can miners and on the mining companies’ journey across the watershed of na-
tional independence in the Maghreb. Phosphate’s own journey through the 
refining and marketing process, into sacks and onto fields around the planet, 
where it would help raise crops to feed a booming population, also deserves 
more attention. But this article has at least begun to chart some of the connec-
tions between the extractive spaces in the phosphate archipelago. 
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